Bijdrage Martijn Snoep aan werkgroep Europees Parlement over Europees mededingingsbeleid

Speaking Notes of Martijn Snoep for meeting with the Working Group on Competition Policy of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament on 4 March 2026

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this discussion on the future of European competition policy.

Today, I would like to briefly reflect on four topics: national call-in powers for below-threshold mergers, the introduction of an EU New Competition Tool, the future of cooperation within the European Competition Network, and cross-policy/agency guidance for companies contributing to public policy goals.

Call-in powers for below-threshold mergers

Let me start with call-in powers. ACM supports the Working Group’s call for Member States to introduce call-in powers that allow national competition authorities to review mergers that fall below notification thresholds but may nevertheless raise competition concerns.

At the EU level, this issue is particularly relevant in fast-moving and innovative sectors, including artificial intelligence and other strategic technologies. In such markets, acquisitions of smaller innovative firms can eliminate potential future EU competitors before they have the opportunity to grow. These so-called ‘killer acquisitions’ may escape scrutiny under the current thresholds.

At the same time, these powers must function effectively within the European merger control framework. The possibility of an upward referral to the European Commission after a national call-in is currently being challenged before the General Court. ACM supports the Commission’s position in this procedure. In our view, the current Merger Regulation allows such referrals following a call-in by a national authority.

To avoid fragmentation, it is important that national call-in regimes are aligned as much as possible. Within the European Competition Network, we are currently working on best practices for national call-in regimes, aimed both at competition authorities and legislatures, in order to preserve the coherence of the Single Market. In the Netherlands, the new Dutch coalition agreement also supports granting additional call-in powers to the ACM.

New Competition Tool

My second point concerns the introduction of an EU New Competition Tool, as suggested in the report by Mario Draghi on the importance of strengthening Europe’s competitiveness and innovation capacity. In some markets, weak competition is not the result of illegal conduct but of structural characteristics – such as oligopolistic market structures – or business practices that are not illegal but nevertheless hinder competition. Following a market investigation, an NCT would allow DG COMP, for example, to impose on companies proportionate remedies to make markets more contestable, in situations where there is no violation of competition law. Typical remedies are transparency and access obligations and orders to reduce switching barriers for customers.

A New Competition Tool would allow competition authorities to investigate such markets and impose remedies to improve their functioning. These interventions would be forward-looking. They would not involve fines or liability; their sole aim would be to create more competition and more opportunities for innovative firms.

Similar tools already exist. The United Kingdom has used such a market investigation tool for decades, and several EU Member States – including Germany, Italy, Greece, Denmark and Hungary – have introduced comparable instruments more recently. In the Netherlands, the new coalition agreement also announces the introduction of a New Competition Tool.

However, it is important that this type of instrument is also considered at the European level. An EU-level New Competition Tool could complement national tools, reduce the risk of fragmentation within the Single Market, and allow for an efficient division of work between the Commission and national authorities. This division of work could be organized along similar lines to the current 101/102 framework.

Strengthening cooperation within the European Competition Network

My third point concerns cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN). The ECN has been a major success. It has enabled effective coordination between the Commission and national competition authorities, avoided conflicting decisions, and ensured consistent enforcement of EU competition law. 

However, as markets become more complex, the ECN needs to evolve further.

The current model is largely based on coordination. A next step could be to move towards deeper operational cooperation, ensuring that enforcement efforts are efficient and that we avoid both overlaps and enforcement gaps. This is particularly relevant for regional cross-border cases. The Commission rightly focuses on competition problems affecting the entire European market. At the same time, its resources are limited and must be deployed strategically.

This may leave a gap for cases affecting several – but not all – Member States. Such cases may be too large for a single national authority but not necessarily suited for Commission intervention. One possible solution is to handle such cases through joint teams of national competition authorities, for example through Joint Investigative Teams and ideally even joint decisions that are enforceable in the participating Member States. While this approach raises legal and procedural questions, it is worth exploring further.

The upcoming revision of Regulation 1/2003 offers an opportunity to facilitate and encourage such forms of cooperation. Joint investigations could arise from national enforcement pipelines or from cases delegated by the Commission where appropriate.

Cross-policy and cross-agency guidance

Finally, let me turn to cross-policy and cross-agency guidance. European companies operate in an increasingly complex regulatory environment. In many sectors, they must comply simultaneously with competition law, digital regulation, consumer protection rules, data protection requirements, and sector-specific regulation.

In this context, companies sometimes refrain from launching initiatives – whether individually or jointly – because they fear regulatory risks. This can also affect initiatives that could contribute to public policy objectives such as sustainability, resilience, or strategic autonomy.

Enforcement authorities can help address this by providing clear guidance to take away these perceived regulatory risks. At ACM, we already have experience with this approach. For several years, we have provided guidance on sustainability agreements between competing companies. This programme is now being expanded to include initiatives related to strategic autonomy and resilience.

Our latest step is to provide cross-agency guidance. Together with other Dutch regulators – including the data protection authority, the digital infrastructure authority, the media regulator, and the financial conduct authority – we are developing a process for joint guidance for companies that launch initiatives aligned with broader policy objectives.

A similar approach at the European level could be very valuable for European companies. Clear and coordinated guidance across policy areas could reduce regulatory uncertainty and accelerate investment and innovation.

Conclusion

Competition policy remains one of the European Union’s most powerful tools to promote innovation, protect consumers, and strengthen competitiveness. With some adaptions, the framework can evolve to successfully meet new economic and geopolitical realities.

Call-in powers, a New Competition Tool, stronger cooperation within the ECN, and clearer cross-policy guidance can all help ensure that Europe’s competition framework remains fit for the future.

Martijn Snoep, bestuursvoorzitter ACM